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Abstract
We explore whether firm managers trade on future stock price crash risk. This depends on 
managers’ ability to assess future crash risk, and on whether the expected payoff is greater 
than the expected costs associated with potential reputation loss and litigation risk. We find 
that insider sales are positively associated with future crash risk, which is consistent with 
managers’ trading on crash risk for personal gain. We also find that managers take advan-
tage of high information opacity to pursue crash-risk-based insider sales more aggressively, 
but are less able to capitalize on this in the case of financial constraints or post-SOX.
Keywords Insider selling · Managerial opportunism · Financial constraints · Information 
asymmetry · SOX
JEL Classification G14 · G30 · M41
1 Introduction
The literature documents that managers tend to trade on the basis of their advance knowl-
edge of corporate bad news at the expense of uninformed outside investors (e.g., Ke et al. 
2003; Dechow et  al. 2016). Insiders’ motivation for such information-based sales is to 
avoid personal losses associated with the announcement of negative firm news which is 
information previously unknown by outsiders.
In contrast, our paper examines whether corporate insiders trade on future stock price 
crash risk, rather than on specific bad news events that insiders know about exactly via 
their private information. It cannot be taken for granted that managers can recognize future 
stock price crash risk as well, which requires their ability to extrapolate from their inside 
knowledge and information. Thus, ex ante, it is unclear if insiders are able to anticipate 
stock price crash risk. Furthermore, whether insiders will actually trade on future crash risk 
also depends on how they perceive the likelihood of whether the payoff from such strategic 
trading will be greater than the costs associated with potential reputation loss and threat of 
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litigation. Such perceived benefits vis-à-vis costs, due to the unique nature of crash risk, are 
distinct from those from trading on corporate events, especially when looking at crash-risk-
based insider sales made based on a relatively long horizon. For these reasons, whether 
insider sales are associated with future stock price crash risk is an important, open question 
worthy of exploring.
Extant studies (e.g., Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009) attribute stock price crash 
risk to managerial hoarding of bad news. In particular, managers have incentives to hide 
bad news for career and short-term compensation reasons (Jin and Myers 2006; Kothari 
et al. 2009; Baginski et al. 2018). Nonetheless, there exists an upper limit where it becomes 
too costly or difficult for managers to further withhold the bad news, but usually they can-
not anticipate when this point will arrive (He 2015). Once this threshold point is reached, 
it will not be possible to contain all the stockpiled bad news, leading to an abrupt, dramatic 
collapse in stock price, that is, a stock price crash (Chen et al. 2001; Hutton et al. 2009).1 
Accordingly, stock price crash risk refers to the likelihood of a stock price crash due to bad 
news hoarding (e.g., Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et  al. 2009).2 Such bad news withheld 
could be of any kind that, once released, would lead to a stock price fall.
On the other hand, if corporate bad news is released to the market on a timely basis 
and the stock price falls, there will be no stock mispricing and no incentive for informed 
insider trades. Put differently, informed insider sales are likely only when the disclosure of 
bad news is delayed with stock prices consequently overstated; nonetheless, it is difficult to 
empirically identify whether a particular piece of bad news had been withheld before being 
released. Therefore, compared with various corporate bad news events studied in the prior 
insider-trading literature, stock price crash risk provides a powerful, generalized setting in 
which to examine managerial motives behind opportunistic insider sales.
Though managers usually cannot predict exactly the point at which their firm’s stock 
price will actually collapse, they may still be able to assess the likelihood of such an event. 
The aim of our study is to link insider sales with future stock price crash risk. Specifically, 
we investigate whether managers’ anticipation of future stock price crash risk leads them to 
sell down their firm stocks.
Insider sales can also be driven by insiders’ liquidity needs or for portfolio diversifica-
tion purposes (Lustgarten and Mande 1995; Carpenter and Remmers 2001; Frankel and 
Li 2004), and it is difficult for investors to distinguish information-motivated sales from 
liquidity- or diversification-motivated sales (Beneish and Vargus 2002). As a result, legal 
and reputational risks arising from insider sales are expected to be low, thus providing 
insiders with incentives to engage in opportunistic stock sales. Furthermore, since future 
crash risk is uncertain by nature, it is hard for outsiders to identify insider trades that are 
based on future crash risk. Therefore, we predict that insiders have an incentive to sell their 
stocks in anticipation of high future crash risk. Our results confirm this expectation.
1 A stock price crash is conceptually different from an ordinary drop in stock price. Stocks with prices 
declining gradually over time may have very low crash risk.
2 Bad news hoarding is usually regarded as the fundamental driver of stock price crash risk (e.g., Chen 
et  al. 2001; Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et  al. 2009; Kim et  al. 2011a, b; He 2015); the more bad news 
corporate insiders hoard, the higher the crash risk of their firm. Bad news events per se would trigger stock 
price crashes only when the following three conditions all hold: (1) the bad news is severe enough; (2) the 
market cannot anticipate such bad news in advance; (3) insiders do not warn the market of the bad news. 
Hence, bad news events do not necessarily lead to stock price crashes, even though on some occasions 
they do; it is worth further noting that, once bad news is revealed to the public, stock price crash risk will 
become lower as the stock price declines.
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Our empirical analysis covers stock sales made by top managers (i.e., officers and direc-
tors) of a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1993–2013. Because insiders tend 
to trade on varied bad news events, we control for future stock returns and future trad-
ing volume, along with a wide array of determinants of insider sales, in all our regres-
sion analyses. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find strong evidence that insider sales are 
associated with 15-month-ahead crash risk. Our findings are robust to different measures 
of crash risk and potential correlated omitted variable(s). We also demonstrate that reverse 
causality, i.e., that insider selling might affect stock price crash risk, is unlikely to explain 
our results. We conduct further analysis of the positive association between insider trades 
and future stock price crash risk, and find that this association is weaker for financially 
constrained firms, stronger for firms that have a high degree of information asymmetry 
with outsiders, and less pronounced after the implementation of SOX.
Our study contributes to both insider trading literature and crash risk literature. The lit-
erature on informed insider trading finds that insiders tend to trade on their foreknowledge 
of a wide range of bad news events.3 We believe our study advances this stream of litera-
ture along the following four dimensions:
First, our paper extends this literature by linking insider sales directly with the future 
stock price crash risk that results from bad news hoarding. In contrast to previous work 
which mainly examines insider trades made within two quarters ahead of bad news events, 
we focus on the risk of a stock price crash as anticipated by insiders on a relatively longer 
horizon, and illuminate the underlying motivation behind informed trades made based on 
crash risk.4
Second, the prior literature on informed insider trades explores a range of corporate 
news events known exactly by managers. By contrast, we focus on stock price crash risk 
per se, which managers need to make efforts to deduce before trading on it. Furthermore, 
managers’ perceived benefits from trading on future crash risk vis-à-vis the perceived costs 
should inherently differ to those from trading on future corporate events which in them-
selves constitute insider information. In developing our hypotheses, our study adds to the 
insider trading literature by providing insights into the benefits vis-à-vis costs associated 
with informed insider trades.
Third, stock price crash risk provides a more powerful, generalized setting than the 
extant insider trading literature to examine the incentives for insider sales. This is first 
3 These include bankruptcies (e.g., Gosnell et  al. 1992; Seyhun and Bradley 1997), dividend announce-
ments (e.g., John and Lang 1991), SEC enforcement actions (e.g., Beneish 1999; Johnson et  al. 2009; 
Thevenot 2012), disclosures of internal control weaknesses (Skaife et al. 2013), public disclosures of nega-
tive Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters (Dechow et al. 2016), and earnings disap-
pointments (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002; Ke et al. 2003; Darrough and Rangan 2005; Badertscher et al. 
2011; Billings and Cedergren 2015), among others.
4 There are two reasons why we focus on insider sales in this study. First, a stock price increase as a result 
of insider purchases would only result in opportunity costs, not real damages, to an investor who fails to 
buy the stocks that had been purchased by insiders (Niehaus and Roth 1999; Cheng and Lo 2006). In con-
trast, when insider sales are followed by a price decline especially a stock price crash, outside investors 
holding stocks of the firm would suffer substantive losses. Therefore, in general, investors are much con-
cerned about insider sales, especially those made on the basis of future crash risk, rather than about insider 
purchases. Second, insider purchases are far fewer than insider sales in practice because of the prevalent 
practice of companies granting stocks and stock options to corporate insiders. Further, insiders can sell their 
own stocks on a relatively long horizon in advance of their anticipated future crash risk. This selling strat-
egy would subject insiders to relatively low litigation risk and is thus more likely to be utilized by them for 
fulfilling self-serving incentives. Therefore, insider sales made in a longer-horizon anticipation of future 
crash risk should deserve more attention and scrutiny by investors, which is the focus of our study.
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because substantive stock-price falls will not necessarily follow the particular bad news 
events examined in the prior insider-trading research if the market is warned about, or is 
able to anticipate, these events in advance. On the other hand, if bad news is released timely 
to the public and is equitably known to both insiders and outsiders, no informed insider 
sales will take place despite the stock price decline associated with the bad news. Crash 
risk, the risk of a dramatic stock price plunge, potentially results from managerial with-
holding of a wide range of adverse corporate information. Moreover, the payoff to insiders 
from trading on the risk of an abrupt, significant stock-price decline is likely to be consid-
erably larger than the payoff to stock sales made based on an ordinary stock price drop. By 
showing that insider sales are positively associated with future stock price crash risk, we 
are able to substantiate the prevalence of such opportunistic managerial trading behavior.
Fourth, to the extent that insiders can influence whether, when, and how corporate news 
is released, insider trades and the future news events that managers trade on are endog-
enously determined, which the literature on informed insider trades arguably does not take 
into account. Our study explicitly acknowledges this endogeneity concern and seeks to 
mitigate it.
Our study also contributes to the extant crash risk literature. This literature (e.g., Francis 
et al. 2016; Lee and Wang 2017; Kao et al. 2020) focuses predominantly on the determi-
nants of stock price crash risk, with very little attention paid to the implications of crash-
risk exposure for managers’ decision-making. We fill this void in the literature by showing 
how firm crash-risk exposure leads to decisions by insiders to sell down their stocks to 
extract private benefits.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2, we develop our testable hypoth-
eses. Section 3 describes the data sources and variable measures. Section 4 presents the 
research design. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 conducts additional analysis, and 
Sect. 7 concludes.
2  Hypothesis development
2.1  The association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk
Prior research shows that insiders actively trade on their foreknowledge of future bad news 
events. For instance, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) find insider sales occur prior to the filing 
date of bankruptcy petitions. John and Lang (1991) document how insiders in growth firms 
tend to sell their shares prior to dividend initiation announcements that signal reduced 
growth opportunities. Skaife et al. (2013) find that the profitability of insider selling is par-
ticularly high in the years leading up to disclosures of material internal control weaknesses. 
Beneish (1999), Johnson et al. (2009), Thevenot (2012), and Agrawal and Cooper (2015) 
find that insiders sell down substantially more of their stocks before revelations of account-
ing irregularities. Dechow et al. (2016) show that insider sales are significantly higher prior 
to the public release of SEC comment letters relating to aggressive revenue recognition. Ke 
et al. (2003) find that insider sales increase in advance of a break in a string of consecutive 
increases in quarterly earnings. Collectively, this strand of literature suggests that insiders 
can foresee future bad news events, and that they trade intensively to exploit their infor-
mation advantage. To the extent that managers are competent, we posit that insiders can 
appraise the likelihood of a future stock price crash for purpose of selling down their stock 
holdings to avoid the associated monetary losses.
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Managers, who run corporate businesses and possess varied types of private informa-
tion, have discretion on how to publicly disclose their firm’s operational status, business 
strategies, risks, performance, prospects, and any other value-relevant information. They 
can disclose this set of inside information strategically so that outside investors will find it 
difficult to assess future crash risk in the same way insiders can. Consequently, asymmetry 
of information about future crash risk arises between insiders and outsiders, thereby mak-
ing crash-risk-based insider sales beneficial for insiders but harmful to outsider investors.
On the other hand, the risks and costs associated with crash-risk-based insider sales are 
likely to be low for insiders for two reasons. First, insider sales can be attributed either 
to insiders’ exploitation of negative private information (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; 
Kallunki et  al. 2018) or to their liquidity or investment portfolio diversification needs 
(Lustgarten and Mande 1995; Carpenter and Remmers 2001; Frankel and Li 2004). It is 
often difficult for investors to distinguish information-motivated sales from liquidity- or 
diversification-motivated sales (Beneish and Vargus 2002); even if investors can, insid-
ers may still defend themselves against reputational and legal risks by arguing that their 
information-driven sales were not informationally motivated. As such, the expected costs 
to insiders in making informed stock sales are low. Second, due to a firm’s changing exter-
nal environment and internal business operations, the extent of future stock price crash risk 
could be of uncertainty even to corporate insiders. Trading on a piece of information that 
is, by nature, uncertain entails relatively low litigation risk for insiders. Therefore, manag-
ers should have incentives to engage in insider sales based on future crash risk, given that 
the expected costs will likely be lower than the expected payoff. Such a payoff (i.e., losses 
avoided by selling stocks in advance) is potentially more attractive to insiders compared 
to the payoff from stock sales made based on an ordinary stock-price decline. These argu-
ments lead to our first hypothesis stated in the alternative form as follows:
H1 Insider sales are positively associated with future stock price crash risk.
The more strongly insider sales are positively associated with future stock price crash 
risk (i.e., when insider sales vary to a larger extent in response to future crash risk), the 
more pronounced the crash-risk-based insider sales are. In the next section, we further 
examine the cross-sectional variation in the crash-risk-based insider sales.
2.2  Cross‑sectional variation in the association between insider sales and future 
crash risk
Financial constraints refer to frictions that prevent a firm from funding its desired invest-
ments (Lamont et al. 2001). Financially constrained firms require external funds to meet 
their investment needs. Prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Jeng et  al. 2003; 
Fidrmuc et al. 2006) document that insider selling could by itself convey unfavorable infor-
mation to the market, leading to a fall in share price. Because of the information effect of 
insider sales, financially constrained firms, if involved in insider sales, will find it more dif-
ficult to raise external capital for investments and operations (Campello et al. 2010; Ataul-
lah et  al. 2014), and consequently, will become more financially constrained. Thus, the 
costs for managers to pursue crash-risk-based insider sales are expected to be greater in the 
case of financial constraints. Confronted with financial constraints, insiders should refrain 
from trading on future stock price crash risk. This leads to our second hypothesis:
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H2a The positive association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk is less 
pronounced for firms that face financial constraints.
Nonetheless, if insiders do not care about their long-term compensation and career pros-
pects, they will not worry about the increased financial constraints resulting from insider 
sales. Under this premise, higher crash risk, which likely arises due to exacerbated finan-
cial constraints (He and Ren 2020), will induce higher insider selling. Thus, we allow for 
the opposite hypothesis as follows:
H2b The positive association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk is 
more pronounced for firms that face financial constraints.
Insider trading is fundamentally driven by insiders’ information advantage over out-
side investors. Theory (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 
1985; Huddart and Ke 2007) suggests that the greater the magnitude of information asym-
metry between insiders and outsiders, the higher the trading profits insiders can reap from 
their stock trades. Consistent with this notion, Frankel and Li (2004) find evidence that the 
association between insider sales and subsequent returns, which is employed as a proxy for 
the profitability of insider trades, is weaker for firms that experience an increase in finan-
cial statement informativeness and in analyst following. Similarly, Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) show that firm size, an inverse measure of information asymmetry, is negatively 
associated with the extent to which insider trades predict future stock returns. Aboody and 
Lev (2000) predict and find that an increase in information asymmetry between insiders 
and outsiders, resulting from research and development activities, allows insiders to gain 
higher profits from their stock trades. Given the higher trading profits that insiders can earn 
from firms with high information asymmetry, insiders in such firms should have stronger 
motives to trade aggressively in anticipation of high future crash risk. Our third hypothesis 
thus follows:
H3 The positive association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk is 
stronger for firms with greater information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) was implemented in 2002 with the objective of improv-
ing corporate governance and financial reporting quality, and appears generally to have 
achieved this goal. For example, the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts has increased 
(Arping and Sautner 2013), and earnings quality is enhanced (Iliev 2010), both consistent 
with SOX rendering corporate information less opaque. Similarly, by mandating manage-
ment evaluation, and independent audit, of internal control effectiveness, SOX has lowered 
information risk and cost of equity for firms (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009).
We predict that SOX would have reduced opportunistic crash-risk-driven insider sales 
for the following reasons. First, separation of ownership and control induces incentive 
misalignment between managers and shareholders, motivating managers to extract rents 
from shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). One route for managerial rent extraction 
is insider trading whereby insiders (i.e., informed traders) profit at the expense of share-
holders (i.e., uninformed traders) (e.g., Seyhun 1986; Fishman and Hagerty 1992; Bettis 
et al. 2000; Jagolinzer et al. 2011). Given that corporate governance is intended to align 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders, it follows that strong corporate governance 
should mitigate opportunistic insider sales that are detrimental to shareholders. In this vein, 
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if SOX has enhanced corporate governance, insiders should be less likely to trade on future 
crash risk after the enforcement of SOX.
Second, low information opacity reduces the profitability of insider trades (e.g., Kyle 
1985; Huddart and Ke 2007). If SOX has improved disclosure transparency and financial 
reporting quality for firms, information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders should 
be lower. As a result, insiders would profit less from their informed trades, and accordingly, 
have weaker incentives to dispose of their stocks on the basis of their assessed future crash 
risk.
Third, the legal and reputational costs associated with insider sales are expected to 
be greater post SOX, which thereby disincentivizes corporate insiders from engaging in 
crash-risk-based stock sales. Based on the above arguments, we expect SOX to have weak-
ened insiders’ incentives to trade on future stock price crash risk, and establish our fourth 
hypothesis:
H4 The positive association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk is 
weaker after the implementation of SOX.
3  Sample and variable construction
3.1  Data sources and sample
Our insider trading data are obtained from the Thomson Financial Insider Research Ser-
vices Historical Files. We restrict our insider trading transactions to open market trades, 
exclusive of non-open market trades such as option grants, option exercises, dividend rein-
vestments, stock transfers among family members, and pension transactions (Huddart and 
Ke 2007; Huddart et al. 2007).5 We further limit our insider trading transactions to those 
by officers and directors only, excluding those by non-officer employees who are unlikely 
to impact major corporate decisions.6 For each firm, we sum all purchases and sales by 
managers in the fiscal years of interest to allow us to focus on the actions of the manage-
ment team in aggregate.7
We obtain our financial analyst data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) database. Other data are taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and Compustat. Our sample period ranges from 1993 to 2013. We end our sample 
period in 2013 because the institutional trading data required for constructing our dedicated 
5 Compared with buying put options, timing stock sales could be a more flexible tool for insiders to avoid 
losses from potential stock price crashes. According to previous studies (e.g., Amin and Lee 1997; Hyland 
et al. 2003), firms with optioned stocks are fewer than those with non-optioned stocks, hence option trades 
by insiders are less prevalent than stock trades by insiders in the capital market. Thus, consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006; Huddart and Ke 2007; He and Marginson 2020), we focus on insiders’ 
stock trades in this paper.
6 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use the insider trades by CEOs, CFOs, and chairmen of 
boards (namely, senior insiders) only. We do not compare trades by insiders, who are in different positions, 
in our empirical analysis because of likely sharing of inside information among the insiders.
7 For a given firm in a fiscal year, some insiders might be selling while others might be buying. In this case, 
insider purchases are subtracted from insider sales to reflect the net direction of insider sales in that fiscal 
year. In so doing, we control for the confounding effects of insider purchases on our regression analysis in 
which insider selling is the dependent variable.
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institutional ownership variable are only available for us for the period before 2014.8 We 
restrict our sample to firms with the necessary data to allow us to construct the variables 
we need for our empirical tests. Our final sample for testing the association between insider 
sales and future stock price crash risk comprises 32,326 firm-year observations for 7135 
unique firms. Table 1 reports summary statistics for all the variables which are used in our 
hypothesis tests and defined in the “Appendix”.
3.2  Measures of firm‑specific stock price crash risk
As with prior research (e.g., Chen et  al. 2001; Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et  al. 2009; 
Kim et al. 2011a, b; Callen and Fang 2015; DeFond et al. 2015), we focus solely on firm-
specific stock price crash risk; crash risk that is ascribed to market-wide factors is beyond 
the scope of this study. We employ three measures of stock price crash risk. The first is 
the likelihood of negative, extreme firm-specific weekly returns over a fiscal year (namely, 
crashrisk) as per Hutton et al. (2009). crashrisk equals 1 if a firm experiences one or more 
firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific 
weekly return over a fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.9 Our second crash risk measure (namely, 
ncskew) follows Chen et al. (2001) and is the negative third moment of each stock’s firm-
specific weekly returns. The third measure of crash risk (duvol) is the down-to-up variance 
of firm-specific weekly returns as per Chen et al. (2001). duvol equals the standard devia-
tion of “down”-week firm-specific weekly returns (scaled by the number of “down”-weeks 
minus one), divided by the standard deviation of “up”-week firm-specific weekly returns 
(scaled by the number of “up”-weeks minus one) over a fiscal year. The firm-specific 
weekly returns measure used in calculating crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol follows Kim et al. 
(2011a), and is adjusted for market-wide factors. In line with prior literature on stock price 
crash risk (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a, b; Callen and Fang 2015; DeFond et al. 
2015), high values of crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol proxy for a high likelihood of a stock 
price crash. In anticipation of high stock price crash risk, insiders would have a tendency of 
selling their stocks to avoid monetary losses associated with a stock price crash.
In line with Hutton et  al. (2009), our main tests are based primarily on the crashrisk 
variable; the other two crash risk measures are used for robustness purposes. As reported 
in Table 1, the mean value of crashrisk is 0.1791, indicating that firm-specific stock price 
crash risk for a fiscal year amounts to 17.91%. This is close to that reported by Hutton et al. 
(2009) though they use a shorter sample period than we do. The correlation matrix (not 
reported for simplicity) reveals that crashrisk is highly, positively correlated with ncskew 
and duvol (0.411 and 0.392), respectively.
8 We thank Brian Bushee for sharing the institutional investor classification data which we use to derive the 
variable for dedicated institutional stock ownership.
9 Our inferences for the hypothesis tests remain the same if we re-define the negative, extreme firm-specific 
weekly returns as being lower than the mean firm-specific weekly return by 3.1, or 3.3, standard deviations. 
We also obtain similar results when using the number of crash weeks over a fiscal year to measure crash 
risk.
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3.3  Measures of insider sales
Insiders are subject to an established legal jeopardy for selling immediately (e.g., within 
one quarter or less) before price-relevant events (e.g., Garfinkel 1997; Noe 1999; Huddart 
et  al. 2007). Thus, we measure insider selling in a way such that its measurement win-
dow ends three months prior to the beginning of the year for which the crash risk vari-
able (crashrisk) is measured. In particular, our insider sales variable (lnetsales) equals the 
natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., insider sales minus 
insider purchases) made by all a firm’s directors and officers over a year ending three 
Table 1  Summary statistics
This table tabulates the descriptive statistics of all the variables used for the hypothesis tests. The sample 
period ranges from 1993 to 2013. All the variables are defined in the “Appendix”
Variables No. of firm-
years
No. of 
unique 
firms
Mean Std.dev. 25th Median 75th
lnetsales 32,326 7135 6.0513 6.0302 0 7.6014 11.9184
laglnetsales 32,326 7135 5.5796 6.0249 0 0 11.7166
llaglnet-
sales
32,326 7135 5.0925 5.9900 0 0 11.5090
lllaglnet-
sales
32,326 7135 4.6237 5.9120 0 0 11.2077
crashrisk 32,326 7135 0.1791 0.3834 0 0 0
ncskew 32,326 7135 − 5.1003 18.1146 − 12.3201 − 4.4734 3.0900
duvol 32,326 7135 − 0.1773 0.4339 − 0.4119 − 0.1523 0.0849
changeroa 32,326 7135 − 0.0214 1.3579 − 0.0314 − 0.0011 0.0203
roa 32,326 7135 0.0256 1.9649 − 0.0049 0.0357 0.0734
retvol 32,326 7135 0.1305 0.0979 0.0725 0.1065 0.1571
sales_
growth
32,326 7135 0.6130 66.2252 − 0.0454 0.0675 0.2051
optiong 32,326 7135 2.5428 8.0249 0 0 1.3
size 32,326 7135 6.0937 2.0959 4.6585 6.1764 7.4993
btm 32,326 7135 0.9334 5.9271 0.3153 0.5442 0.9038
ret 32,326 7135 0.0148 0.6886 − 0.2998 − 0.0597 0.1897
tradvol 32,326 7135 1.3851 1.4487 0.4066 0.8935 1.8417
leadret 32,326 7135 − 0.0045 0.7120 − 0.3282 − 0.0689 0.1876
leadtradvol 32,326 7135 1.4281 1.7546 0.4157 0.9036 1.8464
anacov 32,326 7135 31.8642 43.0978 1 17 44
hp 32,326 7135 − 1004.1310 1181.3660 − 1554.8140 − 418.0119 − 104.5542
kz 23,479 5932 1.0763 11.2736 0.4347 0.8256 1.2595
ww 32,326 7135 − 0.2357 2.3346 − 0.2887 − 0.2198 − 0.1506
payout 11,074 3201 0.0796 27.4089 0 0.1448 0.4080
stdearnings 32,326 7135 94.1098 943.2668 3.4301 11.2160 40.7433
opacity 23,208 5680 18.7112 336.6337 0.0525 0.1313 0.4598
dedi 32,326 7135 0.0581 0.0846 0 0.0242 0.0920
sox 32,326 7135 0.5420 0.4982 0 1 1
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months prior to the beginning of the year for which the crash risk variables are measured, 
and equals 0 if the volume amount of net insider sales is negative.10 Part (a) of Fig. 1 por-
trays the timeline for the crash risk and insider selling variables’ measurement windows. 
This shows how lnetsales is measured over the 12-month period (t − 9/4, t − 5/4) ending 
one quarter before the crashrisk estimation period (t − 1, t), where t denotes the end of the 
crash risk fiscal year.11
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1  Timeline for the measures of insider sales and crash risk. a The association between insider sales 
and 15-month-ahead crash risk. Notes: a shows the timeline for measurements of the dependent variable 
(i.e., lnetsales) and the key independent variable (i.e., crashrisk) that are used for the multivariate tests of 
the hypotheses H1–H4. Both the crash risk variable and insider selling variable are defined in the “Appen-
dix”. b The association between insider sales and 27-month-ahead crash risk. Notes: b shows the time-
line for measurements of the dependent variable (i.e., laglnetsales) and the key independent variable (i.e., 
crashrisk) that are used for the test of the association between insider sales and 27-month-ahead crash risk. 
Both the crash risk variable and insider selling variable are defined in the “Appendix”
10 We get even stronger results in support of our hypotheses if we re-define the insider sales variable in a 
way that it is added with a negative sign when the volume amount of net insider sales is negative. All our 
results also hold if we use the dollar amount of net insider sales, or the volume or dollar amount of raw 
insider sales, to construct our insider selling variables.
11 We do not separate routine insider trades from non-routine insider trades in our analysis. This is because 
in an attempt to make their trades appear non-opportunistic and “uninformed” to outside investors, insiders 
may engage in routine trades, instead of non-routine trades, to reduce detection risk and potential reputa-
Do corporate insiders trade on future stock price crash risk? 
1 3
4  Research methodology
4.1  Multivariate test of the hypothesis H1
To test the hypothesis H1, we employ the following pooled OLS regression model:
The theme of the hypothesis test is to look at whether insiders’ anticipation of future 
crash risk motivates them to sell down their stocks in advance. The causality flow runs 
from future crash risk to insider sales. Thus, the dependent variable is lnetsales and the 
key independent variable is crashrisk, both of which are as defined previously. Prior stud-
ies that examine information-driven insider sales conduct multivariate analyses, in which 
the dependent variable is insider sales, and the key independent variable is future bad news 
events which proxy for insiders’ foreknowledge of future bad news events (e.g., Ke et al. 
2003; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005; Agrawal and Cooper 2015; Dechow et al. 2016). Our 
regression model specification is akin to those used in these studies. In a similar way to 
prior research, we use future crash risk to proxy for insiders’ anticipation of future crash 
risk and as our key explanatory variable for insider sales.
Insiders trading immediately (e.g., within one quarter or shorter) before price-relevant 
corporate events violate insider trading laws directly, and will trigger exceptionally high 
litigation risk (e.g., Garfinkel 1997; Huddart et al. 2007), compared with trading a longer 
time in advance. Therefore, in our main tests, we allow a 3-month interval between the 
measurement window of insider selling and that of crash risk.12 As such, on average, crash 
risk is measured 15 months ahead of insider sales. Based on the hypothesis H1, the coef-
ficient on crashrisk should be positive and statistically significant at a conventional level.
We include a broad set of control variables in the regression to mitigate potential cor-
related- omitted-variable(s) bias. As discussed in Sect. 2, information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders likely induces more insider sales, whilst financial constraints and 
the implementation of SOX likely reduce insider sales. Therefore, we control for informa-
tion asymmetry (stdearnings), financial constraints (ww), and SOX (sox) in our regression 
model. Earnings volatility (stdearnings) is used as the proxy for information asymmetry, 
and is expected to be positively correlated with insider sales. For our measure of finan-
cial constraints, we employ Whited and Wu’s (2006) WW index. A high value of the WW 
index (ww) represents a high degree of financial constraints, and hence should be associ-
ated with reduced insider sales.
Because high stock return volatility provides insiders with more room to exploit their 
information advantage and to profit from their stock trades, we control for stock return 
(1)
lnetsales = 훼0 + 훼1crashrisk + 훼2changeroa + 훼3roa + 훼4retvol + 훼5salesgrowth
+ 훼6optiong + 훼7size + 훼8btm + 훼9qtrret + 훼10tradevol + 훼11leadqtrret
+ 훼12leadtradevol + 훼13anacov + 훼14laglnetsales + 훼15stdearnings + 훼16ww
+ 훼17dedi + 훼18SOX + 훼19year−fixedeffects + 훼20industry−fixedeffects + 휀
tional and legal costs associated with informed insider sales (e.g., Amel-Zedeh et al. 2019; He and Margin-
son 2020).
Footnote 11 (continued)
12 All the inferences for the tests of the hypotheses H1–H4 remain unchanged if we remove the three-
month interval.
 G. He et al.
1 3
volatility (retvol), and expect it to be positively related to insider sales. Strong external 
monitoring restrains opportunistic informed trades. Hence, we control for analyst cover-
age (anacov) and dedicated institutional stock ownership (dedi). Higher analyst coverage 
and higher dedicated institutional ownership are likely to be associated with more inten-
sive external monitoring (e.g., Chen et al. 2015, 2007; He et al. 2019) and thus with less 
informed insider sales. We control for firm size (size) because insiders in large firms trade 
their stocks more actively (Lakonishok and Lee 2001). We also include the number of 
option grants (optiong), as Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that insiders sell more shares 
when granted more stock options. We include sales growth (salesgrowth) since Rozeff and 
Zaman (1998) find that insiders in growth firms sell down more of their stocks. Piotroski 
and Roulstone (2005) find that insider trades are positively related to future earnings per-
formance (a proxy for insiders’ superior knowledge about future cash flow realizations), 
positively associated with book-to-market ratio, and negatively related to recent returns 
(proxies for insiders’ contrarian beliefs). Hence, we control for return on assets (roa), 
change in return on assets (changeroa), book-to-market ratio (btm), and buy-and-hold stock 
returns (ret). We include these variables also because they capture firm performance and 
future prospect that are likely to be correlated with both insider sales and future crash risk.
High trading volume is associated with a large difference in opinions among investors 
(Chen et al. 2001) and hence with a higher likelihood of stock mispricing. Since insiders 
have incentives to trade against mispricing, trading volume should be positively associated 
with insider trades. High trading volume is also associated with stock liquidity. The more 
liquid the stocks, the easier it is for insiders to dispose of their shares. We therefore include 
trading volume (tradevol) in our regression model and expect tradevol to be positively 
related to insider sales. The inclusion of ret and tradevol in the regression also reduces any 
potential correlated-omitted-variable(s) bias induced by events (e.g., M&A) that influence 
firm fundamentals. ret and tradevol are measured in the same window as that of lnetsales, 
while the other foregoing control variables are measured in a one-year window that ends at 
the beginning of the measurement window for our crash risk variables. Following Cheng 
and Lo (2006), we also include lagged insider sales (laglnetsales) to further control for 
unobserved factors that might be driving insider sales. As suggested by prior literature, 
insiders are inclined to trade on various bad news events. To control for this possibility, we 
further include in our regression future stock returns (leadret) and future trading volume 
(leadtradevol), which are measured in the same window as that of our crash risk variables. 
All the control variables are defined in the “Appendix”. Last, we include industry- and 
year-fixed effects in our regression model to control for any systematic variation in insider 
sales across industries and years.
4.2  Tests of the hypotheses H2–H4
For ease of interpretation of the coefficients and to mitigate measurement problems, we 
adopt subsample analyses to test the hypotheses H2-H4. H2 relates to the effect of firm 
financial constraints on crash-risk-based insider sales. In testing this hypothesis, we employ 
four proxies for financial constraints: (1) the WW index developed by Whited and Wu 
(2006), (2) the HP index developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), (3) the KZ index devel-
oped by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and (4) the dividend payout ratio used by Denis and 
Sibikov (2010). The WW index, HP index, and KZ index are coded in a way such that 
higher values represent greater financial constraints. The dividend payout ratio runs in the 
opposite direction: higher dividend payout indicates lower financial constraints (Fazzari 
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et al. 1988). Detailed definitions of these variables are given in the “Appendix”. We parti-
tion our full sample into two subsamples based on the sample medians of the WW index, 
HP index, and KZ index, respectively, and on an indicator variable for whether a firm has a 
dividend payout in the fiscal year. Then we estimate Model (1) separately for the two sub-
samples that are formed based on the four financial constraint indicators, respectively. If 
the hypothesis H2a (H2b) holds, the coefficient on crashrisk should be less (more) positive 
for the high-financial-constraint subsample than for the low-financial-constraint subsample.
The hypothesis H3 is concerned with whether information asymmetry between insiders 
and outsiders moderates the relationship between insider sales and future crash risk. To 
test this hypothesis, we first split our full sample into two subsamples based on the sample 
medians of the measures of information asymmetry. Financial opacity (opacity) is used as 
the proxy for information asymmetry and is measured as per Hutton et  al. (2009). High 
financial opacity indicates high information asymmetry. We estimate Model (1) separately 
for the two subsamples. The hypothesis H3 predicts that the coefficient on crashrisk for the 
high-information-asymmetry subsample is more positive than that for the low-information-
asymmetry subsample.
Finally, the hypothesis H4 explores whether SOX has a moderating effect on the rela-
tionship between insider sales and future crash risk. To test this hypothesis, we divide our 
full sample into two subsamples based on an indicator variable for whether a firm is in the 
pre- or post-SOX period, and then run Model (1) separately for these two subsamples.13 If 
the hypothesis H4 is supported, crashrisk should have a more positive coefficient for the 
pre-SOX subsample than for the post-SOX subsample.
4.3  Accounting for endogeneity
Insider trading, by itself, helps push stock prices towards fundamental value (Piotroski and 
Roulstone 2005), thus reverse causality might arise in the way that insider sales reduce 
stock price crash risk. However, this potential reverse causality relates to a negative, con-
temporaneous association between insider sales and crash risk, which is unlikely to explain 
the positive, lead-lag association between insider sales and crash risk, as predicted in the 
hypothesis H1. In particular, firm-specific stock price crashes are, fundamentally, triggered 
by a “burst-out” of accumulated withheld bad news (Jin and Myers 2006; Hutton et  al. 
2009; He 2015). If managers withhold and accumulate bad news, the extent to which their 
stocks are overpriced will increase, with a consequential increase in stock price crash risk. 
If, on the contrary, managers release bad news when known, stock prices will move towards 
fundamental value on a timely basis, such that the degree of overpricing will be abated, 
and crash risk will fall. In a similar way, insider sales will move stock prices towards intrin-
sic value, thereby mitigating crash risk as well. Whereas a stock price crash might, occa-
sionally, follow insider sales, in such a case, it would be the actual insider sales driving the 
stock price down towards fundamental value in the cross-section; as such, the likelihood of 
any future stock price crash will be reduced. Most importantly, our main results concern 
insider sales that are made on an average of 15-month-ahead crash risk, and hence are 
13 In testing the hypothesis H4, we exclude the financial crisis period 2007-2009 (e.g., Jaggi et al. 2010; 
Acharya et al. 2009; Adrian and Shin 2010) to eliminate the potential confounding effects of the crisis on 
crash-risk-based insider sales in the post-SOX sample period.
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unlikely to be driven by any potential reverse causality which runs in the opposite direction 
to our prediction in the hypothesis H1.
Another possible explanation for the hypothesis H1 is that, in order to profit from 
insider sales, managers might withhold bad news to achieve a higher stock price before 
insider sales, which increases the probability of a stock price crash. Nevertheless, manag-
ers only have the incentive to withhold bad news before their insider-sales transactions, 
and will no longer have such an incentive after they have sold down their stocks. For this 
reason, managerial incentives for insider selling cannot be used to proxy for actual insider 
sales in our study which is concerned with insider sales made on a relatively long horizon 
(i.e., 15-month-ahead on average), hence the alternative explanation is unlikely to hold. 
That said, to further alleviate potential endogeneity issues, we do an analysis of the impact 
threshold for a confounding variable method per Larcker and Rusticus (2010), and conduct 
a falsification test. Results are discussed in the next section.
5  Empirical results
5.1  Results for the hypotheses H1–H4
Table 2 reports the regression results for the test of the association between insider sales 
and future stock price crash risk. The coefficient on crashrisk is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. A one-unit change in crashrisk leads to a change of 0.1783 in 
lnetsales, which accounts for around 3% of its mean value for our sample. This result sup-
ports the hypothesis H1—insider sales are positively correlated with future crash risk. This 
suggests that insiders are able to assess the likelihood of the future stock price crash that 
results from bad news hoarding, and this motivates insiders to sell their stocks in anticipa-
tion of high future crash risk. We check the robustness of our baseline regression results 
using our alternative measures of crash risk, ncskew and duvol, which are described ear-
lier in Sect. 3.2. Results are reported in Columns (2) and (3), and our inferences remain 
unchanged. Most control variables have statistically significant coefficients with the 
expected signs.
Table  3 reports the regression results for Model (1) estimated separately for our two 
subsamples comprising firms with high versus low financial constraints. The crashrisk 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant across all the low-financial-constraint 
subsamples (which are represented by dww = 0, dhp = 0, dkz = 0, and dpayout = 1, respec-
tively). In contrast, the coefficient for crashrisk, albeit positive, is not statistically signifi-
cant for the high-financial-constraint subsamples (represented by dww = 1, dhp = 1, dkz = 1, 
and dpayout = 0, respectively). These results indicate that the positive association between 
insider selling and future crash risk is evident only for firms that are in the low-financial-
constraint subsample, thus lending support to the hypothesis H2a.
Table 4 presents the regression results for Model (1) run separately for the subsample 
firms with high versus low information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. dopac-
ity = 1 (0) represents the high- (low-) information-asymmetry subsample with above- 
(below-) median value of opacity, respectively. crashrisk has a highly significant, positive 
coefficient in the high-opacity (dopacity = 1) subsample but a statistically insignificant 
coefficient (p = 0.796) in the low-opacity (dopacity = 0) subsample. These results suggest 
that the positive link between insider sales and future crash risk is more evident for firms 
that have high information asymmetry, thus consistent with the hypothesis H3.
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Table 2  Test of H1: the association between insider sales and future stock price crash risk
Variables Pred. Sign Dependent variable = lnetsales
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept ? 0.2553 0.3555* 0.4217**
(0.217) (0.088) (0.045)
crashrisk + 0.1783**
(0.012)
ncskew + 0.0052***
(< 0.001)
duvol + 0.2874***
(< 0.001)
changeroa − − 0.0196 − 0.0197 − 0.0215*
(0.106) (0.102) (0.078)
roa − − 0.0183** − 0.0183** − 0.0192***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.010)
retvol + − 1.1809*** − 1.2120*** − 1.0538***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
salesgrowth + 0.0118 0.0118 0.0119
(0.168) (0.167) (0.167)
optiong + 0.0213*** 0.0216*** 0.0216***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
size + 0.4465*** 0.4402*** 0.4301***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
btm + − 0.0009 − 0.0008 − 0.0010
(0.784) (0.821) (0.780)
ret − 0.8955*** 0.8955*** 0.8892***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
tradevol + 0.2653*** 0.2653*** 0.2620***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
leadret − − 0.0472 − 0.0455 − 0.0297
(0.192) (0.207) (0.415)
leadtradevol + 0.0412* 0.0430* 0.0468**
(0.081) (0.068) (0.048)
anacov − 0.0041*** 0.0040*** 0.0042***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
laglnetsales + 0.4710*** 0.4710*** 0.4710***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
stdearnings + − 0.0001* − 0.0001* − 0.0001*
(0.094) (0.094) (0.098)
ww − 0.3452 0.3449 0.3462
(0.160) (0.159) (0.160)
dedi − 3.3248*** 3.3284*** 3.3109***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
sox − − 0.2599 − 0.2589 − 0.2690
(0.285) (0.286) (0.268)
Year-fixed effects Included Included Included
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Table 5 reports the regression results for the test of the hypothesis H4. Subsamples are 
formed based on whether firms are in the post-SOX or in the pre-SOX period. The coef-
ficient for crashrisk in the pre-SOX (sox = 0) subsample is positive and statistically signifi-
cant (p = 0.035), whereas the coefficient for crashrisk in the post-SOX (sox = 1) subsam-
ple is only marginally significant (p = 0.073).14 This finding suggests that insider sales are 
more strongly, positively associated with future crash risk before the implementation of 
SOX, and is also consistent with Hutton et al. (2009) who find that the positive association 
between financial opacity and future crash risk subsides in the post-SOX era.
5.2  Results for coping with potential endogeneity
In all the multivariate tests that we have conducted thus far, we control not only for an 
extensive set of variables that are potentially correlated with both insider sales and future 
crash risk, but also for industry-fixed effects. But we cannot completely exclude the possi-
bility that our regression analysis still omits some variable(s) that might drive both insider 
sales and crash risk. To address this concern, we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010) to 
conduct the Impact Threshold for a Confounding Variable (ITCV) test. Bias induced by an 
omitted variable is determined by its correlations with the key independent variable and 
with the dependent variable, and can be appraised by the impact threshold for a confound-
ing variable (ITCV). The ITCV is defined as the minimum value of the product of two 
correlations (i.e., the partial correlation between the dependent variable and the confound-
ing variable, and the partial correlation between the key independent variable and the con-
founding variable) that would cause the observed statistical relation between the key inde-
pendent variable and the dependent variable to become statistically insignificant at the 5% 
level. Using the ITCV, we can gauge how strong the confounding effect would have to be 
to invalidate our results and inferences should an omitted variable have been controlled in 
the regression model (Frank 2000). The larger the value of ITCV, the less susceptible our 
Table 2  (continued)
Variables Pred. Sign Dependent variable = lnetsales
(1) (2) (3)
Industry-fixed effects Included Included Included
R-squared 0.4088 0.4089 0.4090
Num. of observations 32,326 32,326 32,326
This table reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the association between insider sales and 
future stock price crash risk. The sample period covers the years 1993–2013. The dependent variable is 
lnetsales. The key independent variables are crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol, three distinct proxies for stock 
price crash risk. All the variables in the table are defined in the “Appendix”. Year- and industry-fixed effects 
are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The industry-fixed effects are based on the 
industry dummies constructed from the first two digits of SIC codes. The p values in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, *represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance 
levels (two-tailed), respectively
14 Option grant data in Compustat are missing for almost all firm-year observations for the years before the 
passage of SOX. Hence, we do not include the optiong variable in the multivariate test of the hypothesis 
H4.
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Table 4  Test of H3: the 
moderating effect of information 
asymmetry
Variables Dependent variable = lnetsales
dopacity = 0 dopacity = 1
Intercept 0.9252** − 0.7530**
(0.021) (0.015)
crashrisk 0.0320 0.3332***
(0.796) (0.003)
changeroa 0.0086 − 0.0127
(0.719) (0.225)
roa 0.1661*** − 0.0325***
(0.001) (< 0.001)
retvol − 1.8936*** − 1.1386**
(0.007) (0.021)
salesgrowth 0.0801 0.1439***
(0.126) (< 0.001)
optiong 0.0330*** 0.0165*
(0.001) (0.068)
size 0.4392*** 0.6849***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
btm 0.0025* − 0.0108
(0.070) (0.311)
ret 1.1067*** 0.6120***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
tradevol 0.2388*** 0.2717***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
leadret 0.0260 − 0.0197
(0.729) (0.702)
leadtradevol 0.0060 0.0657**
(0.917) (0.026)
anacov 0.0069*** 0.0032**
(< 0.001) (0.034)
laglnetsales 0.4906*** 0.4500***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
stdearnings − 0.0001*** − 0.0001
(0.002) (0.198)
ww 3.1971** 4.1194***
(0.038) (< 0.001)
dedi 4.1739*** 4.0897***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
sox 0.8249* 0.4590
(0.078) (0.215)
Year-fixed effects Included Included
Industry-fixed effects Included Included
R-squared 0.4091 0.4183
Num. of observations 11,604 11,604
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regression results are to potential omitted-variable(s) bias. Table 6 reports the results of our 
ITCV test. The ITCV is estimated to be 0.0075, which is higher than the absolute value of 
the impact factor (Impact) of all the control variables (except the lagged dependent vari-
able, laglnetsales) used in Model (1). This result provides assurance that our findings relat-
ing to our main hypothesis H1 are robust to the potential correlated-omitted-variable(s) 
problem.
To lend more credence to our baseline regression results, we also conduct a placebo 
test. Specifically, we look at stock trades made by non-officer employees who are unlikely 
to affect major corporate decisions. If any correlated omitted variable, or reverse causality, 
were driving our main results, we should find a significant association between non-officer 
employees’ stock sales and future stock price crash risk. However, as shown in Table 7, we 
fail to find any such result, thereby rendering it unlikely that our main results are driven by 
omitted variables or reverse causality.
6  Additional analysis
In our main tests, we link insider sales with future crash risk on a 15-month-ahead horizon. 
In this section, we conduct longer-horizon tests of the hypothesis H1 by moving the meas-
urement window of future crash risk beyond 15 months. Specifically, we link insider sales 
to 27-month-ahead crash risk.15 Part (b) of Fig. 1 presents the timeline for our measure-
ment windows of insider sales and of 27-month-ahead crash risk.16 We replace lnetsales 
with laglnetsales on the left-hand side of Model (1), substitute laglnetsales for llaglnetsales 
on the right-hand side of the equation, and re-run the regression model.
Table  8 reports the regression results. The coefficient on crashrisk has the predicted 
positive sign but is statistically significant only at the 10% level (p = 0.083). A one-unit 
increase in crashrisk leads to an increase of 0.1397 in laglnetsales, which is equivalent 
to approximately 2.2% of its mean value in our sample. Collectively, we find relatively 
weaker evidence on insider sales that are made based on 27-month-ahead crash risk than 
Table 4  (continued)
This table reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the 
hypothesis H3 as regards the moderating effect of information asym-
metry on the association between insider sales and future crash risk. 
The sample period ranges from 1993 to 2013. The dependent variable 
is lnetsales. The key independent variable is crashrisk. The moderator 
variable pertains to information asymmetry which is proxied by opac-
ity. The full sample is split into two subsamples separated by dopacity, 
a binary variable constructed based on the sample median of opacity. 
All the variables in the table are defined in the “Appendix”. Year and 
industry dummies are included but not reported for brevity. The indus-
try-fixed effects are based on the industry dummies constructed from 
the first two digits of SIC codes. The p values in brackets are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, *represent the 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively
15 In parallel with footnote 12, we also find evidence (results not tabulated for brevity) that insider sales are 
positively associated with 2-year-ahead stock price crash risk.
16 In un-tabulated tests, we expand our measurement window of future crash risk from 1-year duration to 
2-year, which commences 3 months after the end of the measurement window for insider sales. Our infer-
ences remain similar for using this alternative measure of future crash risk.
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Table 5  Test of H4: the 
moderating effect of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
This table reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the 
hypothesis H4 as to the moderating effect of Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(SOX) on the association between insider sales and future stock price 
crash risk. The sample period ranges from 1993 to 2013, excluding the 
financial crisis period 2007–2009. The dependent variable is lnetsales. 
The key independent variable is crashrisk. The moderator variable is 
sox. The full sample is split into two subsamples based on sox. All the 
variables in the table are defined in the “Appendix”. Year and indus-
try dummies are included but not reported for brevity. The industry-
Variables Dependent variable = lnetsales
sox = 0 sox = 1
Intercept 0.0115 0.6841**
(0.961) (0.021)
crashrisk 0.2337** 0.1886*
(0.035) (0.073)
changeroa 0.0813 − 0.0505
(0.288) (0.106)
roa 0.2476* − 0.0278***
(0.069) (< 0.001)
retvol 0.5132 − 4.2329***
(0.301) (< 0.001)
salesgrowth − 0.0093 0.0358
(0.245) (0.110)
size 0.3121*** 0.6185***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
btm − 0.0021 − 0.0199
(0.462) (0.542)
ret 0.5745*** 1.0681***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
tradevol 0.4471*** 0.2981***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
leadret − 0.0410 − 0.0389
(0.405) (0.627)
leadtradevol 0.0934 0.0839***
(0.114) (0.005)
anacov 0.0102*** − 0.0004
(< 0.001) (0.789)
laglnetsales 0.4838*** 0.4584***
(< 0.001) (< 0.001)
stdearnings − 2.37E−05 − 0.0001***
(0.287) (0.001)
ww 0.1974 1.0062*
(0.195) (0.095)
dedi 6.0705*** 1.1341**
(< 0.001) (0.041)
Year-fixed effects Included Included
Industry-fixed effects Included Included
R-squared 0.3530 0.4191
Num. of observations 14,804 11,915
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on 15-month-ahead crash risk. This suggests that insiders are less able to forecast and trade 
on longer-term future crash risk. Such results and inferences are robust to running the 
ITCV and placebo tests covered in the previous section.
7  Discussion and conclusion
7.1  Implications of our findings
Crash-risk-based insider trades profit insiders at the expense of outside investors. This 
reinforces the need to deter such inequitable trades. As noted earlier, insider sales made 
based on future crash risk at a relatively long horizon are hard to see through and/or litigate 
against, not only because it is usually hard for investors to distinguish and authenticate 
information-driven sales from liquidity- or diversification-driven sales, but also because 
the extent of future crash risk is subject to considerable uncertainty. Therefore, it is difficult 
to inhibit such insider trading activities directly. However, they can be curbed indirectly. 
Theory (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985; Huddart and Ke 2007) suggests 
that insider trades will be profitable to insiders only when information asymmetry exists 
between insiders and outsiders. In our case, if future stock price crash risk is assessed 
equally well by insiders vis-à-vis outsiders, insider trades based on future crash risk will be 
unprofitable to insiders and could thus be disincentivized. One way to put outsiders in an 
equal position to insiders in assessing future crash risk is to mandate managers to disclose 
their inside information in a complete, accurate, precise, and timely manner. Given the 
prevalence and significance of crash-risk-based insider sales as documented in our study, it 
is imperative for not only regulators but also firm shareholders to require managers to com-
mit to full, timely, and accurate disclosures of corporate news to the market irrespective of 
the nature of the news.
7.2  Concluding remarks
This study examines whether managers sell their stocks based on future stock price crash 
risk. To our best knowledge, this paper is the first to address this issue directly in the lit-
erature. We find that insider sales are positively associated with future crash risk, which 
is consistent with insiders being able to assess future crash risk and to exploit this infor-
mational advantage for personal gain. We also find that the positive association between 
insider sales and future crash risk is more evident for firms that have high information 
opacity but less evident for firms that are financially constrained or in the post-SOX era. 
Our study sheds new light on crash-risk-based insider trades which circumvent extant legal 
disciplines, and offers insights on how such informed trades may plausibly be curbed in 
practice.
Acknowledgements We appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions from Cheng-Few Lee, the 
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fixed effects are based on the industry dummies constructed from the 
first two digits of SIC codes. The p values in parentheses are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, *represent the 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively
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Appendix: summary of variable definitions
Variables Definitions
crashrisk 1 if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard 
deviations below the mean of firm-specific weekly returns in a fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise. Our firm-specific weekly returns measure follows Kim et al. (2011a)
ncskew The negative of the third moment of each stock’s firm-specific daily returns follow-
ing Chen et al. (2001)
duvol The standard deviation of “down”-week firm-specific weekly returns (scaled by the 
number of “down”-weeks minus 1), divided by the standard deviation of “up”-
week firm-specific weekly returns (scaled by the number of “up”-weeks minus 
1) over a fiscal year. The firm-specific weekly returns measure follows Kim et al. 
(2011a)
lnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., insider 
sales minus insider purchases) made by all the directors and officers over a year 
ending 3 months prior to the beginning of the year for which crashrisk, ncskew, 
and duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the volume amount of the net insider 
sales is negative
laglnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., insider 
sales minus insider purchases) made by all the directors and officers in the year 
ending 15 months prior to the beginning of the year for which crashrisk, ncskew, 
and duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the volume amount of the net insider 
sales is negative
llaglnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., insider 
sales minus insider purchases) made by all the directors and officers in the year 
ending 27 months prior to the beginning of the year for which crashrisk, ncskew, 
and duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the volume amount of the net insider 
sales is negative
nonofficerlnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., insider 
sales minus insider purchases) made by all the non-officer employees over a year 
ending 3 months prior to the beginning of year for which crashrisk, ncskew, and 
duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the volume amount of the net insider sales 
is negative
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Table 7  Placebo test: the 
association between non-officer 
employees’ stock sales and future 
stock price crash risk
Variables Dependent vari-
able = nonofficerl-
netsales
Intercept − 0.0768
(0.741)
crashrisk 0.0611
(0.374)
changeroa 0.0040
(0.405)
roa − 0.0029
(0.511)
retvol 0.2382
(0.476)
salesgrowth 0.0024
(0.422)
optiong 0.0144*
(0.050)
size 0.2642***
(< 0.001)
btm 0.0019
(0.487)
ret 0.3056***
(< 0.001)
tradevol 0.1515***
(< 0.001)
leadret 0.0147
(0.682)
leadtradevol 0.0891***
(0.001)
anacov − 0.0005
(0.726)
nonofficerlaglnetsales − 0.1205***
(< 0.001)
stdearnings − 0.0001**
(0.035)
ww 0.0722
(0.404)
dedi 2.3204***
(< 0.001)
sox 0.0651
(0.710)
Year-fixed effects Included
Industry-fixed effects Included
R-squared 0.1298
Num. of observations 32,326
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Variables Definitions
nonofficerlaglnetsales The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., insider 
sales minus insider purchases) made by all the non-officer employees over a year 
ending 15 months prior to the beginning of year for which crashrisk, ncskew, and 
duvol are measured, and equals 0 when the volume amount of the net insider sales 
is negative
hp A financial constraint index (hp) developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). 
hp = − 0.737*totassets + 0.043*totassets2 − 0.040*age, where totassets is the natu-
ral logarithm of total assets capped at $4.5 billion, and age is the number of years 
for which a firm has been listed
ww A financial constraint index (ww) developed by Whited and Wu (2006).
ww = − 0.091*cash_flow/ta − 0.062*dividend_dummy + 0.021*ltd/ta − 0.044*totas-
sets + 0.102*industry_sales_growth − 0.035*sales_growth, where cash_flow is 
cash flow from operations divided by lagged total assets, dividend_dummy equals 
1 if a firm has paid dividends, and 0 otherwise, ltd/ta is the ratio of long-term 
debt to lagged total assets, totassets is the natural logarithm of lagged total 
assets, industry_sales_growth is annual growth of industry sales at the three-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level, and sales_growth is annual change 
in sales divided by lagged sales
kz A financial constraint index (kz) developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
kz = − 1.002*(cf/ta) − 39.368*(div/ta) − 1.315*(ca/ta) + 3.139*lev + 0.283*mtb, 
where cf/ta is the ratio of cash flow to lagged book assets, div/ta is the ratio of 
cash dividends to lagged book assets, ca/ta is the ratio of cash balance to lagged 
book assets, lev is the ratio of total debt to book assets, and mtb is the market-to-
book ratio
payout The dividend payout ratio, which equals dividend payout divided by earnings before 
interests and taxes
changeroa Return on assets for the next fiscal year divided by that for the current fiscal year
roa Return on assets at the end of the next fiscal year
salesgrowth Sales revenues for the current fiscal year minus sales revenues for the previous fis-
cal year, scaled by sales revenues for the previous fiscal year
optiong The number of options grants at the end of the fiscal year
ret Buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of a firm in the fiscal year, which is measured 
in the same window as our insider sales variable (i.e., lnetsales) is
leadret Buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of a firm in the fiscal year, which is measured 
in the same window as our crash risk variables (i.e., crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol) 
are
size The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s equity at the end of the fiscal 
year
Table 7  (continued) This table reports the OLS regression results for the placebo test 
which explores the association between non-officer employees’ stock 
sales and future stock price crash risk. The sample period covers the 
years 1993–2013. The dependent variable is nonofficerlnetsales. The 
key independent variable is crashrisk. All the variables in the table 
are defined in the “Appendix”. Year- and industry-fixed effects are 
included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The indus-
try-fixed effects are based on the industry dummies constructed from 
the first two digits of SIC codes. The p values in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, *represent the 
1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respec-
tively
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Table 8  Additional test: the 
association between insider sales 
and 27-month-ahead stock price 
crash risk
Variables Dependent variable = lagl-
netsales (27 months 
ahead)
Intercept − 1.9435***
(0.000)
crashrisk 0.1397*
(0.083)
changeroa − 0.0334*
(0.092)
roa − 0.0202**
(0.023)
retvol − 0.7105
(0.112)
salesgrowth 0.0069
(0.392)
optiong 0.0203***
(0.001)
size 0.4411***
(< 0.001)
btm − 0.0008
(0.787)
ret 0.7774***
(< 0.001)
tradevol 0.1720***
(< 0.001)
leadret 0.0180
(0.739)
leadtradevol 0.0604**
(0.025)
anacov 0.0049***
(< 0.001)
llaglnetsales 0.4757***
(< 0.001)
stdearnings − 0.0002***
(0.002)
ww 0.2924
(0.173)
dedi 3.4802***
(< 0.001)
sox 1.9482***
(< 0.001)
Year-fixed effects Included
Industry-fixed effects Included
R-squared 0.4030
Num. of observations 25,106
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Variables Definitions
btm The book value of firm equity divided by the market value of firm equity at the end 
of the fiscal year
tradevol Daily dollar trading volume (i.e., the closing price at a given date times the number 
of shares traded at that date) (in millions of U.S dollars) averaged over a fiscal 
year for a firm. tradevol is measured in the same window as that of our insider 
sales variable (i.e., lnetsales)
leadtradevol Daily dollar trading volume (i.e., the closing price at a given date times the number 
of shares traded at that date) (in millions of U.S dollars) averaged over a fiscal 
year for a firm. leadtradevol is measured in the same window as that of our crash 
risk variables (i.e., crashrisk, ncskew, and duvol)
anacov The number of analysts that make at least one earnings forecast for a firm in the 
fiscal year
dedi Dedicated institutional investors’ stock ownership as a percentage of a firm’s out-
standing shares at the end of the fiscal year
sox 0 if a firm is in the pre-SOX period (i.e., years 1993–2002), and 1 if a firm is in 
the post-SOX period (i.e., years 2003–2013), which excludes the financial crisis 
period 2007–2009
retvol The standard deviation of daily market excess return over a 12-month period ending 
at the end of the fiscal year
opacity The three-year moving sum of the absolute value of annual abnormal accruals, a 
measure of financial opacity developed by Hutton et al. (2009)
stdearnings The standard deviation of income before extraordinary items in the current and 
previous four fiscal years
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